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SYMPOSIUM
DISSONANCE AND DISTRESS IN BANKRUPTCY
AND MASS TORTS
Andrew D. Bradt,* Zachary D. Clopton** & D. Theodore Rave***
This Essay reviews the highly successful Fordham Law Review symposium
entitled Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and
Bankruptcy, held in 2022. The symposium brought together judges, scholars,
and practitioners who work on multidistrict litigation (MDL), bankruptcy, or
both. The symposium was successful because it brought these groups into
conversation at a time when high-profile mass tort defendants are
increasingly turning to bankruptcy to escape MDL, while others involved in
the MDL process seek to keep them in. The symposium was also successful—
and distressing, in our view—because it highlighted disturbing trends in
complex litigation.
This Essay makes two principal observations. First, we document the
different ways that MDL and bankruptcy players view their institutions. Even
if they share similar goals of achieving lasting resolutions to mass tort
disputes, they come from different starting points and stress different values.
Civil litigators, including those who work in MDLs, hue to traditional notions
of victims, liability, and adversarial adjudication. Bankruptcy lawyers,
meanwhile, focus more on creditors, preserving value, and moving on.
Second, we demonstrate that criticisms of MDL’s treatment of individual
plaintiffs—both in the symposium and outside it—are being leveraged by
defense-side interests seeking to promote bankruptcy as a means of resolving
mass torts. Taken together, these two observations reveal a dissonance
between the seemingly pro-plaintiff criticisms of MDL and the seemingly
pro-defendant use of those criticisms to denigrate MDL in favor of
bankruptcy.

* Professor of Law, Associate Dean of J.D. Curriculum and Teaching, and Faculty Director
of the Civil Justice Research Initiative at the University of California, Berkeley School of
Law.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law.
*** Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. Thank you to Michael
Chen for invaluable research assistance, to the participants in the symposium, and to the
editors of the Fordham Law Review. This Essay was prepared for the Symposium entitled
Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and Bankruptcy, hosted by the
Fordham Law Review on February 25, 2022, at Fordham University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fordham Law Review’s editors could hardly have felt more justified
in choosing Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and
Bankruptcy as their symposium topic than when a major development
happened during the symposium. While the proceedings unfolded, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey released its blockbuster
decision approving Johnson & Johnson’s attempt to shift its
multibillion-dollar liability in talc-related tort litigation to a new subsidiary
that it had immediately placed into bankruptcy.1 This maneuver, which has
increasingly penetrated the public discourse in part because of its catchy
name, the “Texas Two-Step,”2 demonstrates the importance and persistence
of the question: can and should mass torts be handled through bankruptcy,
as opposed to other aggregate-litigation processes such as multidistrict
litigation (MDL)?3
Bankruptcy is nothing new in the world of mass torts.4 After all, the more
massive the tort, the bigger the liability. And, the bigger the liability, the
more likely bankruptcy becomes for a defendant.5 The Texas Two-Step,
however, allows a defendant to unilaterally opt out of litigation, without the
headache of putting the company through bankruptcy, by spinning off a
bespoke entity that it then takes into bankruptcy while the rest of the company
operates normally.6 Should Johnson & Johnson’s gambit succeed, that
success would usher in a new frontier in mass torts, and one that demands
the immediate attention of the legal academy, bench, and bar. This
symposium will advance that investigation, thanks in large part to the
generative and candid interaction between different players in the system that
the event fostered.

1. In re LTL Mgmt., 638 B.R. 291, 323–24 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022).
2. The name is derived from the unusual Texas law that allows the move, though some
have suggested that other names would be more accurate. See Samir D. Parikh, Mass
Exploitation, 170 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 57 & n.21 (2022) (mentioning “divisive merger”
and the author’s preference for “corporate mitosis”).
3. See, e.g., Noman N. Kinel, The “Texas Two-Step” Firestorm: This Is No Dance!,
NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 22, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/texas-two-stepfirestorm-no-dance [https://perma.cc/6GZ2-P9SB].
4. See, e.g., Hosp. & Univ. Prop. Damage Claimants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re
Johns-Manville Corp.), 7 F.3d 32, 33 (2d Cir. 1993); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims,
Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 209; Edith Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future
Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695, 1695 (1998);
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUD. CTR., JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY
CASES (2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/gibsjudi_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
57AG-NVWT]; Troy A. McKenzie, The Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Pre-History, 5 J. TORT L.
59, 59 (2012) (discussing the Ringling Brothers case); Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a
Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960 (2012)
[hereinafter McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model]; Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a
Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045,
2045 (2000); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 848 (1984).
5. See supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Parikh, supra note 2; Michael A. Francus, Texas Two Stepping Out of
Bankruptcy, 120 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 38, 45 (2022).
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Much of what made the symposium so successful—aside from its
immediate relevance—was the collection of participants that it brought
together: scholars of complex litigation and bankruptcy, an array of lawyers
who often find themselves embroiled in either or both, and judges from both
district and bankruptcy courts.
But, on reflection, what struck us most from the day’s discussion was the
remarkable level of dissonance among the players. All of us assembled at
this symposium are increasingly part of the same conflict-resolution
orchestra—whether we like it or not. But we are not playing the same tune.
Disagreements emerged, not only on whether civil litigation or bankruptcy
proceedings offer a superior forum for resolving mass torts. There was also
a fundamental disagreement on what is actually occurring within each
system.
First, the scholars and practitioners of bankruptcy and civil litigation
appear to hail from different worlds. The mass tort lawyers, district judges,
and civil procedure scholars in the room brought experience with large-scale
tort cases and MDLs, but admittedly brought little knowledge of the
complexities of bankruptcy. Their counterparts in the bankruptcy world
understand the intricacies of the labyrinthine U.S. Bankruptcy Code and
complex corporate restructuring, but may perhaps be less familiar with the
decades of debates about the management and resolution of mass torts. And
there appeared to be suspicion between these camps. Many of us on the
traditional litigation side are leery of bankruptcy’s visions of tort liability as
just another set of debts to be settled to give the debtor a fresh start, while
those on the bankruptcy side view litigation as a waste of time and money.7
Perhaps unsurprisingly, each side seemed to think that everyone—including
putative tort victims—is worse off on the other side.
Second, and perhaps even more interesting, was the way in which the day
culminated. The final panel addressed the experiences of individual tort
victims in aggregate litigation and bankruptcy.8 But the bulk of the
discussion focused on how individual plaintiffs are treated in MDLs.9 For
those of us who labor in the civil procedure side of the world, the panel could
serve as a time capsule for the debate over mass tort litigation, circa 2022.
As our readers well know, MDL remains the dominant mode of mass tort
resolution in the federal system,10 a result which represents the aspirations of
7. See, e.g., Panel Two: Settlement Dynamics in Mass Torts at the Fordham Law Review
Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and Bankruptcy
(Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6].
8. Panel Four: Reassessing Litigation Objectives Through the Prism of Victims’ Rights
at the Fordham Law Review Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate
Litigation and Bankruptcy (Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/694126999 [https://perma.cc/
VP5J-VML6].
9. See id.
10. David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 405 (2019)
(“From the Deepwater Horizon disaster to the opioid crisis, MDL has become the preeminent
forum for working out solutions to the most intractable problems in the federal courts.”).
Many state courts also have MDL procedures, but in most mass tort litigation, like products
liability litigation, the bulk of the cases are typically filed in, or removed to, federal court, and
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the MDL statute’s drafters.11 Indeed, MDL is the primary forum for the kinds
of mass products-liability litigations, like litigation involving talc and
opioids, that were front and center during this symposium. MDL, as even its
most prominent partisans recognize, is imperfect and continues to evolve as
it enters its sixth decade of existence.12 But even MDL’s critics would admit
that MDL has succeeded where other procedural mechanisms have failed in
providing a forum for coordinated mass tort resolution.13
On this final panel, the loudest criticism of MDL seemed to come from
those who believe that it does not give plaintiffs a fair enough shake.14
Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, in presenting the results of a study
conducted with Dr. Margaret Williams, contended that the MDL process
does too little to respect the interests of individual plaintiffs.15 In their view,
the specialized network of repeat-player MDL lawyers on both sides of cases,
supported by insider MDL judges, tend to serve their own mutual best
interests rather than those of the tort victims.16 As a result, plaintiffs are lost
in the shuffle, not only left with little control over their own cases, but also
often without information as to how those cases are progressing. To support
this position, Professor Burch and Dr. Williams presented survey responses
from individuals whose cases were swept into MDLs, demonstrating
dissatisfaction with the process and its ultimate results.17
Regardless of whether one considers these data persuasive, the last panel
of the day revealed that allegations about MDL’s shortcomings are potent
ammunition not only for those who seek to give plaintiffs more of a say in

the judges and lawyers in satellite state MDLs often coordinate closely with the federal MDL.
See Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, MDL in the States, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1649,
1714–18 (2021).
11. Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class
Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1728 (2017).
12. Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767,
790 (2017) (describing MDL “as a platform for encouraging and enabling judicial procedural
innovations in the form of ad hoc procedure in future complex litigations”). Despite a torrent
of criticism seemingly from all sides, attempts to further regulate MDL or restrict its
availability have thus far failed. Andrew D. Bradt, The Stickiness of the MDL Statute, 37 REV.
LITIG. 203, 204 (2018). And, indeed, one reason for this has been MDL’s success in avoiding
defendants turning to bankruptcy. Panel’s Long-Time Chair Steps Down, THIRD BRANCH, Dec.
2000, at 10, 10 (interview with Judge John F. Nangle).
13. Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict
Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109,
110 (2015) (“While class actions have generally been somewhat been on the decline in recent
years, MDL practice has become so pervasive as to be almost routine.” (footnote omitted)).
14. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret Williams, Perceptions of Justice in
Multidistrict Litigation: Voices from the Crowd, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
15. Id. See generally ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS (2018) (reporting
Burch’s wider study of MDL).
16. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in
Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1458–63 (2017);
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 74
(2017).
17. See generally Burch & Williams, supra note 14.
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mass litigation.18 These criticisms also provide rhetorical support for those
who labor primarily on the defense side to argue that the MDL system is
irredeemably dysfunctional. Counsel for defendants at the event were
attracted to the Burch and Williams presentation like flies to honey—
criticizing MDL practice and, by comparison, legitimizing the turn to
bankruptcy.19 This connection was echoed outside the symposium as well,
when Lawyers for Civil Justice, a prominent defense-side group, cited the
same study to support their proposed rules of MDL procedure.20 Without
descending too far into cynicism, one might reasonably wonder whether
those typically on the defense side of the “v.” truly have plaintiffs’ best
interests at heart, or whether their sudden pleas of sympathy are crocodile
tears. Either way, if these critiques lead to the abandonment of MDL in favor
of bankruptcy—which places far less value on litigant autonomy—the irony
will be thick. The MDL critics will have succeeded only in taking us all the
way through the looking glass.
In this Essay, our goal is simply to preserve the tenor of the day rather than
persuade our readers that any particular position is correct. More research is
necessary to accomplish the latter goal—something that all the professors
present agreed on. Our aspirations are therefore more modest in that we want
to clarify, and perhaps classify, the sources of the dissonance that we
observed during the symposium. In Part I, we describe the dissonance that
characterized the discussions between those who hail from the bankruptcy
world and those who hail from the litigation world, and try to explain why
they see the world so differently. In Part II, we turn our attention to the
remarkable fourth panel, at which the criticisms of MDL were so agilely
taken up by those who would prefer bankruptcy as an alternative—and how
their success would prove a remarkable irony.
I. BANKRUPTCY AND LITIGATION
The symposium offered an important opportunity for lawyers and scholars
involved in mass tort litigation and bankruptcy to learn from one another.
Although mass torts and bankruptcy have long been intertwined, there
remains much more learning to do, especially in a dynamic world. And,
participants disagreed about whether bankruptcy or civil litigation offered the
superior option.
What struck us most about the early panels, though, was something distinct
from the intricate differences between modern case management in the
district courts and the creative implementation of the Bankruptcy Code in
mass tort bankruptcies. Rather, we were struck by the differences in values—

18. See Panel Four: Reassessing Litigation Objectives Through the Prism of Victims’
Rights, supra note 8.
19. Id.; see infra notes 61–64.
20. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMMENT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES AND ITS MDL SUBCOMMITTEE (2022), https://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/
112061707/lcj_comment_on_mdl_sketch_rule_draft_3-8-22.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2X9ENJNM].
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and the rhetoric that illustrated those values—that various participants
invoked. To be clear, these are observations from three professors who live
in the procedure world; to the extent our understanding of bankruptcy is
superficial at best, we hope our colleagues will be forgiving, as we sometimes
find ourselves when reading bankruptcy scholars’ musings on the particulars
of complex litigation.
At the outset, it is important to note that while tort and bankruptcy lawyers
and scholars might seem to hail from different planets, the distance between
them should not be exaggerated. Aggregate litigation in either form pursues
the same goal: a fair, efficient, and equitable outcome for all involved, often
through a final “global resolution” of the underlying disputes.21 And while
we proceduralists emphasize due process and sometimes overly romanticize
concepts like the “day in court” and the “search for truth,” it has long been
the case that (the Owen Fisses of the world aside22) settlement is a central
policy goal, especially in complex litigation.23 But all settlements are not the
same, nor are the processes that lead to them.24 So while both systems may
seek the same ultimate goal, the differences in procedures may lead to
different substantive outcomes.
As the participants made clear, speed and ability for the debtor to emerge
with a “fresh start” are primary goals of bankruptcy proceedings.25 Even
without novel strategies like the Texas Two-Step, many aspects of
bankruptcy, such as those authorizing the automatic stay, channeling
injunctions, and immunity from litigation after approval of a reorganization
plan, illustrate the values prized by bankruptcy.26 Bankruptcy starts from the
presumption that a reorganization is a value-generating transaction. The goal
is to move forward on the assumption that doing so leaves everyone—
creditors and the debtor alike—better off than forcing the debtor corporation
21. See, e.g., McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model, supra note 4, at 960–63;
D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1238–39 (2013).
22. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 (2009) (critiquing Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984)).
23. See, e.g., In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is
a strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action
litigation is concerned.”); Colella v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 569 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530 (W.D. Pa.
2008) (“The strong public policy and high judicial favor for negotiated settlements of litigation
is particularly keen ‘in class actions and other complex cases where substantial judicial
resources can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation.’”).
24. See, e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS, EDWARD F. SHERMAN, HOWARD M. ERICHSON &
ANDREW D. BRADT, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL
PROCEDURE 609–12 (7th ed. 2021) (describing how “different legal regimes” pursue mass
settlement, but noting that “each . . . carries distinct requirements, draws on a different history,
and implicates different policies”).
25. See, e.g., Marama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The principal
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate
debtor.’” (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991))).
26. See, e.g., Lindsey D. Simon, Bankruptcy Grifters, 131 YALE L.J. 1154, 1161–71
(2022); Adam J. Levitin, Purdue’s Poison Pill: The Breakdown of Chapter 11 Checks and
Balances, 100 TEX. L. REV. 1079 (2022).

2022]

DISSONANCE AND DISTRESS

315

out of business and liquidating its assets.27 The question then becomes how
to equitably allocate the proceeds among the various players. When the
bankruptcy is not of the “two-step” variety, the tort claimants are just another
class of creditors—after all, much of the goal of the bankruptcy lawyer is to
consider all the debtor’s obligations to all of its creditors, and to determine
whether bankruptcy makes sense as a tool for a debtor staring down the barrel
of insolvency.
The Texas Two-Step brings these values to tort litigation.28 It lowers the
perceived cost to the debtor of invoking the bankruptcy process because the
debtor need not put its entire operation through bankruptcy nor settle
accounts with all creditors simultaneously.29 While we hope that bankruptcy
judges will not tolerate attempts to play liability shell games or to artificially
cap total tort liability through divisive mergers,30 the Texas Two-Step allows
debtors to create a bespoke entity to compartmentalize tort liability and to
use bankruptcy as a mechanism for satisfying the claims of tort plaintiffs
(present and future) as though they were creditors. The Texas Two-Step is a
solo dance: engage in a divisive merger, allocate the liabilities to the
unfortunate subsidiary, and file for bankruptcy in the preferred venue, all
before a judge who subscribes to the foundational norms of the bankruptcy
system.31
In the end, what one thinks about the Texas Two-Step will turn on one’s
confidence in bankruptcy procedure and bankruptcy judges’ ability to ensure
a defensible outcome. Strong faith in bankruptcy may lead one to view tort
litigation as a big, slowly accruing transaction cost that siphons off resources
that could have either gone to the creditors (tort victims and others) or
perhaps might have been preserved for the debtor. And regardless of the
Texas Two-Step’s viability, one might prefer bankruptcy to MDL because of
bankruptcy’s ability to essentially cut off litigation by new claimants going
forward—so-called “future” claimants.32
The proceduralists at the event espoused a different view. Although
settlement is always a likely outcome, the means of getting there is an
adversarial process. In theory, that process is aimed at ensuring participation
and accurate results, even if it is sometimes slower and more deliberate. This
27. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10–13
(1986); see also McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model, supra note 4, at 963
(“Bankruptcy . . . starts with the assumption that collective resolution is necessary.”).
28. See Parikh, supra note 2, at 58–59; Francus, supra note 6, at 40.
29. See Parikh, supra note 2, at 58.
30. In his LTL Management opinion, Chief Judge Michael B. Kaplan suggested that he
would not look kindly on any such attempts and stood ready to use fraudulent-transfer doctrine
to block them. In re LTL Management, LLC, 637 B.R. 396, 423–24 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022)
(“[W]ith the bankruptcy filing, the bankruptcy estate succeeds to all rights held by the Debtor,
with the oversight and jurisdiction of the Court as needed for enforcement. Significantly, the
resources under the Funding Agreement will be available upon confirmation of the plan—
whether or not the plan is acceptable to J&J or New JJCI, and whether or not the plan offers
payors protection under 524(g).”).
31. See Parikh, supra note 2, at 59.
32. This is not to say that litigation cannot—or has not—dealt with future claims, only
that bankruptcy partisans believe that their process is particularly adept at doing so.
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tradeoff is reflected prominently in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which sets out the goal of promoting the “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every proceeding.”33 As any first-year law
student understands, however, it is difficult to have all three of those
adjectives simultaneously describe any given case. We might have to fudge
on justice to get to a result quickly and cheaply, or we might simply accept
that getting to the right answer through a process where all parties have the
opportunity to be heard is going to cost money and take time. Aggregate
litigation ramps up the inherent challenge posed by these competing values
because the more complex litigation is, and the more parties are involved, the
harder it will be to figure out the best ways to make the tradeoff. Insisting
too much on participation could make litigation interminable, while insisting
too much on efficiency runs the risk of unjust outcomes, which may result in
illegitimacy and dissatisfaction.
Class actions and MDL represent attempts to cut this Gordian knot, and
there have been decades of debates over how well they do it, both in general
and relative to one another.34 One underlying assumption of this symposium
is that class action treatment is largely unavailable in the kinds of mass torts
that the group was focused on. That has left MDL as the most likely
aggregation mechanism in federal court, and MDL attempts to solve the
problem of the tradeoff between efficiency and participation by essentially
maintaining a “split personality.”35 That is, MDL is simultaneously a
temporary aggregation of separate cases for pretrial proceedings before
remand for trial and a tightly knit aggregate managed by the transferee judge
and the lawyers appointed to leadership positions. While MDL represents an
effective mechanism for achieving mass settlements of enormous litigations,
it is not entirely at the expense of the other side of its personality, which
adheres to traditional adversarial norms of individual litigation. In MDL,
mass tort settlement designers often strive to approximate the closure that
bankruptcy takes for granted,36 but for any global resolution to stick, the
fundamental structure of MDL requires buy-in from the plaintiffs
themselves.
This emphasis on the adversarial process and individual participation was
missing from the way in which the symposium’s bankruptcy players spoke.
That is not to say that the claimants’ lawyers in a bankruptcy are not
adversarial, but their goal is not to prove liability for harm. Their goal is to
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
34. See generally Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots
as a Class Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1736 (2017); Thomas E. Willging &
Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort
Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to
“Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms:
Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251,
1256–58 (2018); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the
Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1269–72 (2017).
36. D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2175, 2176–77 (2017).
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compete with others similarly situated for their client’s piece of the pie.37 In
a sense, then, tort claimants in the bankruptcy process are no more victims of
a legal wrong than any other creditor. All creditors are owed a debt, and all
will share in the equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets according to their
priority in the bankruptcy. While the closure that bankruptcy offers may
sometimes increase the size of the pie, converting tort victims from plaintiffs
to creditors can significantly reduce their leverage to demand their share.
True, they can lengthen negotiations, and, if they have the numbers, threaten
to vote down the reorganization plan, but they lose the ability to use litigation
tactics. No longer can the plaintiffs threaten a jury trial and all that comes
with it, including the potential risk for damaging press, exceptionally large
damage awards, or punitive damages. Moreover, the victims lose their
chance—even through a proxy—to tell their story in open court to people
who must listen.
These competing visions are not just the musings of academics studying
these processes from afar. One virtue of this symposium was that it brought
together academics with practitioners and judges who live in these worlds
every day. The competing visions we just described could not have been
more clearly expressed than by the judges on the symposium’s lunchtime
keynote panel. In one corner was U.S. District Judge Patti B. Saris. Judge
Saris’s reaction to the discussion of the way in which bankruptcy handles
mass tort cases was remarkable. As she noted, bankruptcy lawyers focus on
“peace.”38 But, in the civil litigation world where she resides, she stated,
“I don’t think about peace, I think about the merits of the lawsuit.”39 She
described civil litigation in this way:
[Y]ou do go in, right from the beginning with discussions that are not
anything like what you heard this morning. I worry about the plaintiffs:
can they meet the burden? Do they have good claims? Are the defendants
liable? We go straight to the merits of the thing . . . . [W]e go through
everything that you all probably learned in law school. Motions to dismiss,
plausible claims, summary judgment, Daubert hearings to see if the science
is good—we go right to the merits. One of the things I never think about
is, taking notes this morning, when I get a case, I don’t think about creating
value, preserving value.40

In the other corner was U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John T. Dorsey. Speaking
about bankruptcy, Judge Dorsey described his world in starkly different
terms:

37. But see Lynn A. Baker, Mass Tort Remedies and the Puzzle of the Disappearing
Defendant, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2020) (noting that defendants in mass tort litigation
may defer to others in the way in which settlement proceeds are divided among plaintiffs).
38. Hon. Patti B. Saris, Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Keynote Address at the Fordham Law Review Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The
Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and Bankruptcy (Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/
694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6].
39. Id.
40. Id.
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[A debtor is] coming to the bankruptcy court so they can get a full
resolution of all of those claims. So if you have a debtor who is coming in,
and you know the value, you start with the value of the company, how much
is the company worth? And you look at, what are the claims against the
company, how are we going to maximize the value for the claimants who
are going to be recovering? Because you want to maximize the value of
the company, so that you can maximize the value for the creditors of the
company—creditors of the company in case of mass torts or the individual
claimants who have claims against the company. And so, how do you
resolve those? And it’s certainly not a perfect system. As a bankruptcy
judge, I cannot liquidate a personal injury claim, it’s not permitted by the
code, so all I can do is estimate those claims in connection with trying to
come up with what value is there available to pay those claims. And so it’s
not perfect, it’s done in an expedited fashion for a reason. Usually when a
debtor files for bankruptcy, the cost is astronomical for a large company in
bankruptcy, it can run into the millions, tens of millions of dollars a month
to be in bankruptcy. So they’re losing even more money as they’re going
along, when you’re trying to preserve as much as you can. So you’re trying
to move the case along. I think that’s the purpose of the bankruptcy code. 41

The dissonance between these two views of the judicial role is striking
because they represent the underlying primary considerations of the two
systems.42 Even the vocabulary differed in meaningful ways. Judge Saris
talked about claims, merits, and liability. Judge Dorsey wants to maximize,
estimate, and expedite. Judge Saris said she does not focus on preserving
value. Judge Dorsey used the word “value” six times in just the small portion
of his remarks reprinted here.
One open question is whether these competing visions matter in the end.
After all, MDL settlement designers often strike deals aimed at creating or
preserving value, and bankruptcy lawyers must grapple with the merits to
figure out how to value creditors’ claims. This symposium can pose, but not
answer, that question. There is more work to be done. But the language is
suggestive—highly suggestive, in our view—of the fact that these processes,
seeking similar ends, do so through very different mechanisms, and in service
of very different values.
II. PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS
Although the central theme of the symposium was bankruptcy and
litigation, a related conversation developed about what occurs within mass
litigation itself. This conversation is important in its own right, but will also
(we suspect) have direct consequences for the bankruptcy-versus-litigation
debate.

41. Hon. John T. Dorsey, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware,
Keynote Address at the Fordham Law Review Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The
Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and Bankruptcy (Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/
694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6].
42. See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text.
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This second conversation hit its peak during the final panel of the day,
entitled Reassessing Litigation Objectives Through the Prism of Victim’s
Rights. The academics on the panel were Professor Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch of the University of Georgia School of Law, Professor Edward Janger
of Brooklyn Law School, and Professor Alexandra D. Lahav of the
University of Connecticut School of Law. Joining them were prominent
attorneys Sheila L. Birnbaum of Dechert LLP, one of the country’s
preeminent mass tort defense lawyers, Elizabeth J. Cabraser of Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, among the most prominent plaintiffs’
lawyers in leadership in aggregate litigations, and Edward Neiger of ASK
LLP, a leading lawyer representing individual plaintiffs in opioids litigation,
among other matters.
Much could be said about this remarkable conversation, but one element
in particular caught our attention. Although we spent most of the day
observing the almost dehumanizing way in which the bankruptcy process
approaches tort victims, this panel’s discussion focused on Professor Burch’s
presentation of her forthcoming study, conducted with Dr. Margaret
Williams (who was not present), which is highly critical of individual
litigants’ experiences in MDL.43 Professor Burch presented survey data that
they collected on perceptions of justice in MDLs related to drugs and medical
devices marketed to women. They put out a nationwide call to all plaintiffs
who had participated in women’s health MDLs, promoting it in major
newspapers, through social media, and through direct outreach to some of the
lawyers involved.44 Out of those hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs, they
received around 200 unique responses.45
Many of the respondents who chose to complete their survey were
profoundly dissatisfied with their representation in the MDLs.46 Survey
respondents felt that their lawyers were not sufficiently communicative about
details like where and before which judge their suits were pending.47
Respondents reported that their lawyers did a poor job of explaining what
was occurring in their cases and the risks and benefits of key decisions.48
Indeed, many could not even recall their attorneys’ names. 49 Many survey
respondents were disappointed in the outcome of the litigation.50 They felt
that their recoveries in settlement were less than they had anticipated at the
outset, that the litigation took longer than they had expected, and that they
never had a chance to tell their stories.51 For many respondents, the litigation
did not meet their goals because the products that had injured them remained

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Burch & Williams, supra note 14.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 18 n.123.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 37–38, 41, 47.
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on the market, the compensation they received was too low, and their quality
of life remained poor.52
This is not the place to delve deeply into questions of methodology, sample
size, and the like. Professor Burch and Dr. Williams are clear in their paper
that their participants were not randomly selected and that they cannot claim
that their results are representative. Their survey methodology was not
designed to generate a representative sample and their sample size is quite
small.53 For this reason, the authors view their study as a pilot project and
call for more research.54 Indeed, Professor Burch used her remarks on this
panel to make a pitch for more studies like this one.55
Generally, in the pursuit of knowledge, some data is better than no data.
Even limited, unrepresentative data can help to uncover potential problems
and identify fruitful research questions. Pilot projects can chart a course for
future research and experimentation. Academic readers know that they need
to be careful with such data. They know to watch out for confounding
variables or selection biases, particularly when a survey sample is not
randomly generated.56 And they know that a baseline question always looms
in the background: “Compared to what?”57 This is perhaps especially true
in complex litigation, where debates over the relative costs and benefits of
aggregation proceed with the background understanding that the gold
standard of participation—an individual trial or even a “day in court”—is
inevitably infeasible.58

52. Id. at 42, 49.
53. As they write, “[W]e know nothing about the underlying population from which
[respondents] are drawn.” Id. at 17.
54. Id. at 5 (“[W]e hope others will continue the work we begin here.”); id. at 18 (“Our
study is the first to examine litigant satisfaction in MDLs, but it should be the first of many.”).
55. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Fuller E. Callaway Chair of Law, University of Georgia
School of Law, Remarks at the Fordham Law Review Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The
Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and Bankruptcy (Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/
694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6] (“We’d love very much to have access to a whole
bunch of plaintiffs, so that we can replicate the study on a much broader plaintiff
population . . . . I think the first step is trying to get a larger data set of MDLs . . . . We’d love
for judges to start a pilot project across a couple of different MDLs where we could look at
more participants to make sure that what we’re saying is representative of the broader plaintiff
population.”).
56. See, e.g., Roger M. Michalski, In a Different Voice, JOTWELL (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/in-a-different-voice/ [https://perma.cc/R9CU-V9BB] (“In short,
the [Burch and Williams] survey is not random and it is difficult to identify a population from
which it samples. Also, as the authors acknowledge, ‘it is possible that those who felt more
strongly about their experiences might have been more likely to participate and, of course,
recollections may be tainted by any number of biases.’ As such, all claims that rely on the
representativeness of the survey must be read with lavish caution.”).
57. Professor Lahav offered one particularly poignant version of this idea, observing that
some of these results might be “endemic to legal practice,” both individual and aggregate.
Alexandra D. Lahav, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Remarks at the Fordham Law
Review Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and
Bankruptcy (Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6].
58. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting
Contours of Due Process and Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 633–34 (2011).
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The day’s events made this question even more palpable as participants
spent most of their time discussing the choice between MDL and bankruptcy,
a prominent comparator. One purpose of procedural scholarship is to clarify
the tradeoffs and better understand the consequences of our choices.
Ultimately, then, Professor Burch is right: more research should be in the
offing, and that research should place a premium on finding the right
comparators, to the extent possible, when examining the inherently messy
world of real-life litigation.
The quest for knowledge in the academy must continue, but that quest is
not purely academic. In law, perhaps more than in other academic
disciplines, the relationship between the academy and the real world is a close
one. And within law, that holds especially true in civil procedure, a field in
which academics, judges, and lawyers alike participate in litigation and
lawmaking.59 Moreover, these processes are inherently political—as
Professor Stephen B. Burbank persistently reminds us, the “dirty little secret”
that “procedure is power” has been out for decades.60 So while we agree that
we academics should not be deterred in our pursuit of knowledge, we also
should remember that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing. The
unavoidable fact is that what academics produce is grist for the political mill,
and participants in the political process are acutely aware of the “compared
to what?” question, as they joust over which forums and which procedures
should apply in real cases.
The final panel was an object lesson. Professor Burch presented her results
carefully and repeated her call for more research. As if those caveats did not
happen, the lawyers who represent mass tort debtors and defendants sprang
into action, as if to say, “See—MDL litigation is a disaster. What do you
have to lose by trying something new?” For instance, Sheila Birnbaum
noted, “None of this surprises me at all, because in the large MDLs, what you
see are most of the plaintiffs’ cases—unless you are one of the bellwether
cases—they are parked.”61 She added, “So it doesn’t surprise me at all that
these people are unhappy with the process, and whatever else, because I think
as Elizabeth also said, some of us have too many cases, and they’re not
paying any attention to the cases that are parked, which are most of them in
the MDL.”62 An audience member, Tancred Schiavoni, a partner at
O’Melveny & Myers LLP who had been an earlier panelist and represents
debtors, chimed in, adding, “This is an area that needs reform. I got to tell
you, we have these shadowy claims aggregators and the people who really
59. This was amply illustrated by Professor Lahav’s “deposition” of Edward Neiger after
he accused the academics on the panel of living in an ivory tower. Alexandra Lahav, Remarks,
supra note 57.
60. Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1927–28 (2008) (“[L]egislators too had learned
procedure’s dirty little secret[,] and . . . interest groups were pushing Congress either to
restrain the judiciary or itself to exercise the power of procedure.”).
61. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Partner, Dechert LLP, Remarks at the Fordham Law Review
Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and Bankruptcy
(Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6].
62. Id.

322

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

own the claims behind them.”63 Birnbaum then noted, “In the free-for-all
that’s the mass tort, and even to our settlers, nobody knows what’s going on.
Cases are being settled, and if you have aggregation of a hundred thousand
cases, settle them all cheap, because the largest fees can be really large.”64
Note, too, that as defense- and debtor-side lawyers jumped on these data to
disparage MDL and pump up bankruptcy, not once did they suggest that
bankruptcy would perform better when it comes to the deficiencies of MDL
that Professor Burch’s respondents reported.
We now lay our own cards on the table: watching those who represent
defense-side interests seize on the Burch and Williams data to argue that
MDL is simply too broken, and that bankruptcy will ultimately leave
individual claimants better off, causes us some angst as proceduralists. Is
bankruptcy normatively better or worse than MDL? Is the Texas Two-Step,
for lack of a better word, a scam? Well, the jury (which might be deployed
in a tort case as opposed to bankruptcy proceedings) is out. It is going to take
hard work and a lot of research and litigation to be able to answer these
questions. But there may not be time for that if those who would prefer
bankruptcy to satisfy their clients’ interests are able to shortcut the debate
through political means. As the final panel illustrated, defendants are quite
adept at deploying arguments that plaintiffs are not getting a fair shake to
advance defendants’ goals.65 There is, of course, nothing wrong with
defense-side lawyers and interest groups lobbying for procedural changes
that would benefit their clients. That is how the system is supposed to work.
But they should do so by convincing decision-makers that the system they
prefer is a better system, not by using feigned concern for their adversaries
to try to undermine the legitimacy of the current system and attack the very
source of their adversaries’ power and leverage.66
So the “compared to what?” question is of more than academic
importance. Whether we like it or not, the academic work on MDL is going
to be leveraged by those who seek alternatives that promote their interests,
whether or not they improve the measures that motivated the initial research.
And there, in a nutshell, is the rub: the irony of defense and bankruptcy
lawyers using arguments that MDL dehumanizes plaintiffs, in favor of a

63. Tancred Schiavoni, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Remarks at the Fordham Law
Review Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and
Bankruptcy (Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6].
64. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Remarks, supra note 61.
65. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. Importantly, this diagnosis extends
far beyond the occasional participation in an academic symposium. Defense-side interest
groups have pointed to arguments that MDL shortchanges individual plaintiffs in multiple
policy forums. Lawyers for Civil Justice, for example, has relied on Professor Burch and Dr.
Williams’s work—including this study—to lobby both Congress and the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules to adopt a series of defendant-friendly rules for MDLs on the premise that it is
necessary to weaken mass tort plaintiff-side lawyers for the protection of their own clients.
See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 20.
66. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your
Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J. 73, 119–23
(2019).

2022]

DISSONANCE AND DISTRESS

323

system that calls them “debtors” and prioritizes “moving on,”67 would be
somewhat hilarious if not potentially tragic. And we should expect this panel
to provide a preview for congressional testimony, floor speeches, and amicus
briefs in the near future.
We end, therefore, with a call for more: More research about MDLs and
bankruptcy. More thinking about what metrics actually matter, and how
these regimes perform on those metrics. And more time to work through
these difficult questions, including at more fantastic events like this one.

67. See supra note 41.

